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Light-Hearted Thoughts About
Discovery Reform
John W. Reed*
I am delighted to be here among friends from various settings and
associations over the years. Having been unable to arrive until late
last evening, I am in a poor position to offer useful commentary on
what has been said here. But no matter-that is not my assignment.
You have heard enough words of wisdom for one weekend. My
pleasant assignment is to offer some "light-hearted" comments on
discovery reform. I hope they do not prove to be "light-headed" as
well.
That the Conference planners expected me to say nothing serious
is indicated by the fact that, at the conclusion of the morning sessions, the registrants were given a choice of three buses-one to the
airport, one to the Bradford Hotel, and only one here to this
luncheon.
I must confess that I am relieved to have seen the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse here in the flesh. During the
past five or six years, when I was the Litigation Council's token academic, the notice for each council meeting stated that the Discovery
Abuse Committee would meet a day early (and so qualify for another
day of per diem allowance at Pebble Beach, Hilton Head, and Bermuda). But I never actually saw them meet. This Conference seems
to provide demonstrative evidence of the Committee's existence, and
I am glad to have seen it. And I do salute Joe Ball and Wey Lundquist and their colleagues for their long, unselfish, thoughtful work in
the service of the entire profession and our system of justice. Unfortunately, the Special Committee may not receive anything other
than a few thanks and statements of appreciation. You may search
the boulevards, parks, and public buildings of the world and you will
not find a single statue erected in honor of a committee.
You may have noticed that the Special Committee is light on law
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teachers, with only one member and the reporter being academics.
But that's just as well. Professors are impractical types. A student
publication facetiously reported a few years ago that the University
of Michigan philosophy department had denied tenure to Jesus and
Socrates for lack of publication credit, and that both would leave
next year for positions in smaller colleges. "We are sorry to lose such
fine teachers," a department spokesman said, "but a rule is a rule is a
rule." The article went on to report the reactions of the two teachers:
Said Jesus, "It's just another cross I have to bear." Said Socrates,
"I'll drink to that."
This weekend you have come to the end of a stage of work which
we here celebrate-the completion of a task in the continuing development of civil procedure before trial. But we must view that work,
and its product, in the context of history.
Some of us are old enough to remember common-law pleading.
There were courses by that name in our law schools. Common-law
pleading, which scholars called issue pleading, involved highly technical "lawyers' games," with lots of fictions and no small measure of
injustice. Those rules-that system-prevailed for more than 500
years.
Then came David Dudley Field and his code, which cast aside
some of the technicalities and adopted what we call fact pleading.
But parties often still went to trial knowing little of the case against
them. Code pleading prevailed for almost 100 years.
And then came the third pretrial regime, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provided for so-called notice pleading and
relied on discovery for the rest. Those Rules, which you are seeking
to improve, went into effect just forty-four years ago.
Listen to those figures again:
-issue pleading: more than five centuries
-fact pleading: almost a century
-notice pleading: just four decades
I entered law school the year after the Federal Rules were
adopted (and, incidentally, also the year after Erie). I do not know
how old you think I am, but we are talking about a short time in
historical terms.
In the Federal Rules, we tried to get away from a procedure that
resembled "blind man's bluff." (By the way, that often appears not
as "blind man's bluff," which is the proper name of the game, but as
"blind man's buff-an error that, for trial lawyers, is probably FreuHeinOnline -- 3 Rev. Litig. 216 1982-1983
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dian.) But as things developed, we replaced trial by ambush with
trial by attrition. As Maurice Rosenberg puts it, we have replaced
trial by ordeal with ordeal by pretrial. Aside from sheer quantity of
discovery requests (what you have been referring to as overuse), there
have been unhelpful answers to document requests, like the sign in
the old hardware store, "We've got it if we can find it." My favorite
unhelpful discovery answer came in a deposition where the question
was: "Are you a Jehovah's Witness?" "No, I didn't even see the
accident."
In these forty years we have adjusted the discovery rules to respond to shortcomings and abuses; and the Special Committee's
study has been one of the most ambitious reconsiderations of the
scheme. That the changes are hardly revolutionary may be evidence
that the existing scheme is fundamentally sound, but it is certainly
evidence that the process of reform is fundamentally difficult. Let
me speak briefly of those difficulties.
First, reform-of anything-is difficult because of inertia. Old
ways of doing things, and of thinking about things, become embedded and are hard to eradicate. It is like the man who went to see his
doctor for a check-up. While examining the man's abdomen, the
doctor appeared puzzled and made some measurements with a ruler.
He then said, "Your navel is almost five inches below where it ought
to be. Have you had an operation?" "No," said the patient. "Is it
hereditary, then?" "No." "Then what do you attribute it to?"
"Well, I don't know," said the patient, "unless it is that for twentythree years I have been flag bearer in my lodge."
Second, there are relatively few empirical data on the subject,
and so our views of the problem tend to be impressionistic; yet one
accurate measurement is worth a thousand expert opinions.
A third difficulty is the natural tendency to approach discovery
reform from a party point of view, just as one approaches an individual case. How will it affect me (and my clients)? You feel like the
man whose Chinese fortune cookie read: "A change for the better is
going to be made against you." And point of view does make a difference, of course. You remember the way in which point of view
affected the young woman's diary of her Caribbean cruise. The first
day's entry read: "I met the captain and I think he is interested in
me." On the second day: "The captain has asked me to have dinner
with him." On the third day: "After dinner, the captain took me to
HeinOnline -- 3 Rev. Litig. 217 1982-1983
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his cabin and said if I didn't give in to him, he would sink the ship. I
saved the passengers and the crew."
A fourth difficulty with discovery reform is the problem of deciding how much reform to attempt, how daring to be. I gather that
Mr. Justice Powell's dissent from discovery amendments this last
time around was based on his feeling that they were not ambitious
enough and would delay effective reform for at least another decade.
He undoubtedly would subscribe to the familiar proposition that it is
usually fatal to try to leap a chasm in two steps. If there isn't a Chinese proverb, there ought to be one, that says: "You might as well
fall on your face as lean over too far backwards."
Whatever the difficulties, the Committee went about its work,
and I am sure that it received various off-the-wall suggestions. Sometimes people all agree on the problem but come up with different,
really strange solutions. I have told some of my Council friends
about the graveside service in a Parisian cemetery. A woman had
died, and all the mourners had left the grave but two men. One had
been her husband and the other her lover. The widower was griefstricken but controlled in his grief. The lover, on the other hand, was
sobbing and weeping and appeared to be about to collapse, when the
husband came over to him, placed his arm about his shoulder reassuringly, and said, "Not to worry, M'sieur; I shall remarry!"
It may be that the Committee received suggested solutions
equally weird (or ingenious, depending on your point of view). The
Committee apparently shied away from a numerical limit on interrogatories, but did it, for example, consider Wade McCree's solution:
unlimited interrogatories, but the lawyer must write them out himself, personally, longhand? (That's a "not-to-worry-M'sieur"
solution.)
Then I noticed that not much has been done to distinguish the
small case from the big one, though 26(b)(1) and 26(g) will give the
judge a push in that direction. Size makes a big difference, and nothing is more unequal than treating unequals equally. We must remember the small case in the small town-the kind of town in which
I went to high school, a town so small that my worst enemy was also
%
my fourth best friend.
But seriously, discovery abuse and reform are almost intractable,
because at heart is the tension between the lawyer's role as an officer
of the court and his role as an advocate for his client. We have, in
HeinOnline -- 3 Rev. Litig. 218 1982-1983

1983]

DISCOVERY REFORM

not so small microcosm, the fundamental issue which fuels the Kutak
rules controversy, with the lawyer in the middle (and, I might add,
by the very nature of his calling) . . .in the middle between court
and client.
It is almost inevitable, therefore, that the reforms proposed be
moderate. (A moderate, you know, is a guy who makes enemies left
and right.) But your proposals are moderate. Not only are they moderate, they are rather general-no mechanical, precise rules such as
numerical limits on interrogatories. They are rather like the liberal
church down the street that has four commandments and six do-thebest-you-cans.
Whatever the particulars, it is fair to say that free enterprise in
discovery is being made less free. As Lundquist and Flegal put it in
the article that has been placed before you, "The laissez-faire era
may be coming to an end." (In a Helen Hokinson cartoon in theNew
Yorker, one club woman at an economics lecture whispers to her fellow member, "Laissez-faire and let laissez-faire, I always say.")
Surely one outcome of all this work and all these discussions will be
that judges will play a more active role in reducing discovery abuse.
Whether it's the judicial control model or the "cooperative oversight" model-whichever model prevails, the judge is going to do
something more.
That may be necessary, may even be inevitable; and it's probably
going to work all right in your district. But a more assertive role for
judges is bound to create some apprehension in districts here and
there where an erstwhile reasonable trial lawyer goes on the bench
and suffers an attack of "federal judge-itis." Then "you've got
trouble right here in River City." Many times it's just self-importance that makes him hard to deal with. He uses the royal "we." I
know one federal judge who. . . well, I won't say he's egotistical, but
he won't take a hot shower because it clouds the mirror. With the
whole world to fall in love with, he chose himself.
And if he's not self-centered, he may be super-contentious-the
only man who can have an argument when he is alone in a room.
Surely judicial oversight by such people is inferior to cooperative
oversight, whatever that is.
As we leave this Conference, the final word ought to be about the
future.
The late Edwin Borchard, of Yale, said, "An optimist is one who
HeinOnline -- 3 Rev. Litig. 219 1982-1983
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believes the future is uncertain." In that sense we all undoubtedly
are optimists about the future of discovery, because it is uncertain.
But thinking of the future is all too rare in our profession, and it is
good to have done it here. My colleague Alfred Conard finds significance in the fact that most science periodicals are designated "journals," which means something pertaining to the day, while law
periodicals are usually called "reviews," which means looking back.
We have, he says, a professional bias somewhat like that of the tail
gunner who fainted when he went up to the cockpit and saw the
world rushing toward him at 600 miles an hour. That you have been
able to look at it and not faint is an encouragement to us all.
Of one thing I am sure, and I am sureyou are sure: although this
Conference and the project it celebrates are milestones in dealing
with pretrial procedure, they are merely milestones; they are not the
destination. As the history I recited earlier shows, the process has
been centuries-long, and it continues, and will continue all our lives,
and beyond. Whatever the devices we create, new problems will
arise to make them inadequate. You may recall the race horse owner
who confronted his jockey after he had lost the race and demanded:
"When that hole opened up in front of you on the home stretch, why
didn't you ride through?" "Because," said the jockey, "the hole was
going faster than we were."
Ultimately, discovery will work fairly, more because individual
lawyers, one by one-you and I-act fairly than by any dramatic
rule change or by judicial management. Perhaps that's what is
meant by "cooperative oversight." When the Council (and presumably the Discovery Committee too) met at Williamsburg, my wife and
I attended the lovely church there in the restored village. The
preacher was the William and Mary chaplain, and I recall his making the profound observation that judgment and salvation can be
spoken of only in the first-person singular. The same may be said for
discovery reform: It must be spoken of in the first person singular,
each one of us assuming his share of responsibility for change.
In a high school class some years ago, the teacher described the
prehistoric age in which dinosaurs inhabited the earth, and she described them as enormous, powerful lizards that had no match, no
need to fear any other form of life. After class, one boy went up to
the teacher and said, "You said the dinosaurs were invincible, but
there aren't any more dinosaurs. They're all gone. My question is,
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who killed the dinosaurs?" "Nobody," she answered. "Nobody
killed the dinosaurs. The climate changed and they all died."
Each of us has aspired to be a dinosaur killer. We would like to
slay the dinousaur-sized problems of discovery reform. But we haven't done it, and we're not going to kill the dinosaurs.
We are, however, each one of us, inevitably a part of the climate.
We can change the climate-and that's how you rid the earth of
dinosaurs.
Again, I salute the Special Committee for its dedicated work, and
the rest of you for your support of its work. And I pray that each of
you will go forth from this place not discouraged, not disheartened
by our failures as dinosaur killers, but newly dedicated to changing
the climate. That, and that only, is the way we shall be saved from
the dinosaurs.

HeinOnline -- 3 Rev. Litig. 221 1982-1983

